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Showing posts from October, 2017

Blog 2.1 - Alec Mueller

1. According to the research, who is more likely to become a lobbyist, a member of the House or the Senate? A member of the house. 2. Why were Congressmen less likely to become lobbyists in the 1970s and 1980s? The lobbying industry was not nearly as big then. 3. Why does this research likely underestimate the revolving door? They only looked at 98 issues and could not find a reliable predictor, but saw that groups that hired a revolving door lobbyist tended to win about 63% of the time 4. Why do you think committee chairmen are more likely to become lobbyists?  They have more influence, knowledge, and connections with the policy they are advocating. 5. Does the author think that registration requirements help prevent former Congressmen from lobbying?  Why?  No, because they can still get things done without registering. 6. What is the difference in money spent on lobbying between "public interest lobbies" and corporations? For every 1 dollar spent for interes

Does campaigning work?

1. What was the overall general finding of Broockman and Kalla’s analysis of campaign activities? In general elections, campaigns’ attempts to win swing voters appear to not work at all. 2. What two time frames did Broockman and Kalla analyze in their study? The 2015 and 2016 elections 3. At what rate did they find that people were actually persuaded with campaign activities close to the election? 11% 4. How were the results different in the study between activities months before the election, and those that occur close to the election day? Kalla and Broockman found that, if the campaign actions such as canvassing, and phone calls happen within two months of election day, the average effect on voter preferences was effectively zero. About one in 800 people reached were persuaded, they estimate. By contrast, when the campaign action happens well before election day, and the effects are measured quickly thereafter, there's a real impact on opinions, but it disappears before electi